Custom Detection Rules finding types
This page lists the finding types that GuardDuty generates from Custom Detection Rules, grouped by data source. Each finding type aggregates one or more signals into a single finding. For more information about enabling Custom Detection Rules, see Custom Detection Rules in GuardDuty.
Note
Individual rules are available only in Amazon Web Services Regions that support the Amazon service or feature that they target. For example, rules that target Amazon Organizations or Amazon Simple Email Service are available only in Regions where those services operate. Similarly, rules that target Lambda function URLs or SageMaker AI notebook instances are available only in Regions where those features are supported.
Custom Detection Rules for Amazon CloudTrail management events
The following finding types are generated from Amazon CloudTrail management event signals, organized by MITRE ATT&CK® tactic.
Credential Access
These rules attempt to detect operations that retrieve or reset credentials, such as retrieving an Amazon EC2 instance password or resetting an Amazon RDS administrator password.
Finding type |
Rule name |
Severity |
|---|---|---|
CredentialAccess:EC2/UnsecuredCredentials |
EC2PasswordDataRetrieved |
MEDIUM |
CredentialAccess:RDS/ModifyAuthenticationProcess |
RDSMasterPasswordReset |
HIGH |
Defense Impairment
These rules attempt to detect changes that disable or weaken security controls, such as deleting VPC flow logs, disabling an organization policy, or removing an account from an organization.
Finding type |
Rule name |
Severity |
|---|---|---|
DefenseImpairment:EC2/DisableOrModifyTools |
EC2TerminationProtectionEnabled |
LOW |
VPCFlowLogsDeleted |
HIGH |
|
DefenseImpairment:Organizations/ModifyCloudResourceHierarchy |
OrganizationLeaveAttempt |
HIGH |
DefenseImpairment:Organizations/DisableOrModifyTools |
OrganizationPolicyDisabled |
HIGH |
DefenseImpairment:RDS/ModifyAuthenticationProcess |
RDSIAMAuthDisabled |
MEDIUM |
DefenseImpairment:Route53Resolver/DisableOrModifyTools |
DNSQueryLogsDeleted |
MEDIUM |
DefenseImpairment:S3/DisableOrModifyTools |
S3CustomerProvidedKeysEnabled |
HIGH |
Execution
These rules attempt to detect changes that run code on a resource, such as modifying a SageMaker AI notebook lifecycle configuration.
Finding type |
Rule name |
Severity |
|---|---|---|
Execution:SageMaker/CommandAndScriptingInterpreter |
SageMakerLifecycleConfigModified |
MEDIUM |
Exfiltration
These rules attempt to detect changes that share resources outside your account, such as making an AMI, Amazon EBS snapshot, or Amazon RDS snapshot accessible to other accounts.
Finding type |
Rule name |
Severity |
|---|---|---|
Exfiltration:EC2/TransferDataToCloudAccount |
AMIExternalAccess |
HIGH |
EBSSnapshotExternalAccess |
HIGH |
|
Exfiltration:RDS/TransferDataToCloudAccount |
RDSSnapshotPubliclyShared |
HIGH |
Exfiltration:S3/TransferDataToCloudAccount |
S3BucketPolicyExternalAccess |
HIGH |
Impact
These rules attempt to detect changes that could disrupt or destroy data and resources, such as setting Amazon S3 objects to expire quickly, or enabling Amazon SES sending.
Finding type |
Rule name |
Severity |
|---|---|---|
Impact:S3/DataDestruction |
S3LifecycleRapidExpiration |
MEDIUM |
Impact:SES/ResourceHijacking |
SESAccountSendingEnabled |
LOW |
SESProductionAccessEnabled |
MEDIUM |
Initial Access
These rules attempt to detect activity that opens access to your environment, such as a console sign-in without MFA or making an Amazon RDS database publicly accessible.
Finding type |
Rule name |
Severity |
|---|---|---|
InitialAccess:IAM/ValidAccounts |
ConsoleLoginWithoutMFA |
MEDIUM |
InitialAccess:RDS/ExploitPublicFacingApplication |
RDSPubliclyAccessible |
HIGH |
Lateral Movement
These rules attempt to detect activity that grants access between resources, such as pushing an SSH key to an Amazon EC2 instance.
Finding type |
Rule name |
Severity |
|---|---|---|
LateralMovement:EC2/RemoteServices |
EC2InstanceSSHKeyPushed |
MEDIUM |
Persistence
These rules attempt to detect changes that create or extend access, such as creating IAM access keys, modifying a role trust policy, or making a Lambda function publicly accessible.
Finding type |
Rule name |
Severity |
|---|---|---|
Persistence:EC2/BootOrLogonInitializationScripts |
EC2UserDataModified |
HIGH |
Persistence:EC2/ExternalRemoteServices |
EC2SecurityGroupPublicSSH |
MEDIUM |
Persistence:IAM/AccountManipulation |
IAMAccessKeyCreated |
LOW |
IAMRoleTrustPolicyModified |
MEDIUM |
|
IAMUserLoginProfileCreated |
HIGH |
|
IAMUserLoginProfileUpdated |
MEDIUM |
|
Persistence:Lambda/AccountManipulation |
LambdaFunctionPublicAccess |
HIGH |
Persistence:Lambda/ModifyAuthenticationProcess |
LambdaFunctionUrlPublicAccess |
HIGH |
Persistence:RolesAnywhere/AccountManipulation |
RolesAnywhereTrustAnchorCreated |
MEDIUM |
Privilege Escalation
These rules attempt to detect changes that grant broader permissions, such as attaching an administrator policy to an IAM user or role.
Finding type |
Rule name |
Severity |
|---|---|---|
PrivilegeEscalation:IAM/AccountManipulation |
AdminPolicyAttachedToRole |
HIGH |
AdminPolicyAttachedToUser |
HIGH |
|
BedrockServiceCredentialCreated |
MEDIUM |
|
SESFullAccessPolicyAttachedToRole |
MEDIUM |
|
SESFullAccessPolicyAttachedToUser |
MEDIUM |
Resource Development
These rules attempt to detect setup of resources that could support later activity, such as verifying an Amazon SES domain identity.
Finding type |
Rule name |
Severity |
|---|---|---|
ResourceDevelopment:SES/CompromiseAccounts |
SESDomainIdentityVerified |
MEDIUM |